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1. METAPHYSICAL REALISM
In 1976 Putnam publicly abjured the realist views that he had once
championed. This notorious change of mind was prompted by a
perceived difficulty with the picture of reference that Putnam saw at
the heart of realism.1 In “Realism and Reason” he referred to this
picture as Metaphysical Realism. The label has later been used for a
number of related views, but I shall reserve it here for the picture of
reference that Putnam presented and attacked in that paper.
Metaphysical Realism (MR), Putnam tells us, “is less an empirical
theory than a model – in the ‘colliding billiard balls’ sense of
‘model’ ”.2 It is an elusive model. Its essential commitment is that
“there has to be a determinate relation of reference between terms
in L and pieces (or sets of pieces) of THE WORLD”.3 But its dis-
tinctive, and, for Putnam, objectionable feature is not so much its
commitment to the existence of this relation as the way in which
the commitment is understood. For MR, “(1) the picture is supposed
to apply to all correct theories at once [: : : ]; and (2) THE WORLD is
supposed to be independent of any particular representation we have
of it”.4
Some critics have objected to the use of the term ‘realism’ for a
picture of reference. Realism, they protest, is a metaphysical doc-
trine, and the connection between issues in metaphysics and issues
in the theory of reference is, at best, not transparent.5 In particu-
lar, it is not clear that the metaphysical doctrine of realism, in its
most interesting form, would have to be abandoned if MR were
found untenable.6 In this paper, I shall not be concerned with how
metaphysical issues would be affected by the demise of MR. I shall
consider instead whether there is a cogent argument against MR.
I shall focus, in particular, on whether the picture is undermined
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by a version of the so-called ‘model-theoretic considerations’ that
Putnam has adduced against it.7
The debate on Putnam’s ‘model-theoretic argument’ against MR
has been remarkably one-sided. Ever since it was first advanced, a
legion of critics have contended that the argument misses its mark
– that it fails to put genuine pressure on the metaphysical realist
picture of reference.8 These attacks have gone largely unchallenged.
Putnam himself has failed to address them in any detail,9 and the
few philosophers who have come in his defence have advanced con-
struals of his argument according to which Putnam’s target is not the
metaphysical realist model itself, but the availability of a plausible
substantive account of the reference relation that MR postulates.10
In this paper, I shall argue that the versions of Putnam’s argument
that his critics have attacked are indeed unsatisfactory. I shall then
contend that the basic thought underlying Putnam’s model-theoretic
considerations can be articulated in a more promising way. I shall
present an argument against MR that appears to incorporate this basic
thought and doesn’t fall prey to the objections levelled by Putnam’s
critics.
2. IDEAL BUT FALSE THEORIES
Let me start by considering the argument against MR actually
advanced in “Realism and Reason” and “Models and Reality”. In
these versions of the argument, a crucial role is played by the thought
that truth is radically non-epistemic, i.e. that a theory that is epis-
temically ideal could nevertheless be false. This thought, Putnam
contends, is a consequence of MR, but MR cannot make sense of
the possibility of an epistemically ideal, yet objectively false theory.
Since MR has a consequence that it cannot make sense of, the pic-
ture is, Putnam concludes, incoherent.11 Thus the argument has the
form of a reductio. It rests on the claim that MR entails two contra-
dictory propositions: that it has to be possible for an epistemically
ideal theory to be objectively false and that it is not possible for an
epistemically ideal theory to be objectively false. Neither entailment
has gone unchallenged.
Critics have argued, first, that it doesn’t follow from MR that it
has to be possible for an epistemically ideal theory to be false.12 It
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is undeniable that MR is compatible with this view.13 It may even
be that MR has been traditionally associated with this claim – that
most philosophers who have thought of reference along the lines of
MR have also construed truth as a radically non-epistemic notion.
But it is far from clear that the latter view is entailed by the former.
In fact, it would be surprising if this entailment obtained. As LePore
and Loewer put it, “MR does not mention ‘ideal’ theory. So it is
hard to see how it could imply ‘It is possible that an ideal theory is
false’ ”.14
These considerations suggest that there is room in principle for
the following position: Reference consists in a relation between the
terms of all theories and pieces of the representation-independent
world, but the facts that single out this relation guarantee that an
epistemically ideal theory will come out true. This is the view that,
according to Lewis, Putnam should have endorsed:
Contra realist orthodoxy, truth simpliciter is equivalent to, or simply is, epis-
temic truth. That is not because there is anything epistemic about truth-on-an-
interpretation. Nor is it because truth simpliciter is anything else than truth on all
intended interpretations. Rather it is because the intendedness of interpretations is
an epistemic matter.15
Thus, on this view, the reference-determining relation between terms
and pieces of the world would be singled out epistemically, i.e. as
the relation that makes the epistemically ideal theory come out true.
As we shall see, there is a problem with the idea that a unique
relation can be singled out in this manner. One may attempt to
put pressure on MR on these grounds, but the resulting argument
would be substantially different from anything actually found in
“Realism and Reason” and “Models and Reality”. Hence, even if
Putnam succeeded in establishing that MR cannot make sense of the
possibility of a false ideal theory, the argument wouldn’t seem to
undermine MR itself. It wouldn’t follow, at any rate, that the view
is, as Putnam claims, incoherent. All that would follow is that the
proponent of MR would have to abandon another article of the realist
credo – the view that ideal theories can be false.
Let me now turn to the other entailment – from MR to the impos-
sibility of a false ideal theory. Putnam’s argument for this entailment
proceeds in two steps. He argues first that there is a way of assigning
extensions in THE WORLD to the terms of an epistemically ideal the-
ory such that if this correspondence were the reference-determining
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relation, the theory would come out true. Then he goes on to argue
that the proponent of MR cannot make sense of the claim that this
correspondence is not the one that determines reference. Therefore,
Putnam concludes, “the supposition that even an ‘ideal’ theory [: : : ]
might really be false appears to collapse into unintelligibility”.16
The first claim is hardly controversial. For every consistent theory
T and every set of object S of the right size, there is a model of T
that has S as its universe. The terms of T can be interpreted on the
elements of S in such a way as to make T come out true. Hence, in
particular, an epistemically ideal theory will have a model with THE
WORLD as its universe. The terms of the theory can be interpreted on
the objects in THE WORLD in such a way as to make the theory true,
subject only to the proviso that the theory has models of the size
of THE WORLD. Notice, incidentally, that, as several commentators
have pointed out, the only role that the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem
plays in the argument is to weaken this proviso. For it follows from
the theorem that if THE WORLD has infinitely many objects, and the
ideal theory has infinite models, the theory will have a model with
THE WORLD as its universe, whatever infinite size THE WORLD may
have.17
The second claim is much more problematic. Let SAT be an
assignment of extensions in THE WORLD to the terms of an epistemi-
cally ideal theory that makes it come out true. According to Putnam,
the proponent of MR cannot make sense of the claim that SAT is not
the reference-determining relation. He argues for this conclusion by
looking at the constraints that we can impose on the relation that
does the job of determining reference. We could impose, he sug-
gests, theoretical constraints, i.e. we could demand that it makes (an
idealisation of) our theory of the world come out true.18 But SAT, by
hypothesis, satisfies this requirement. We could also impose opera-
tional constraints. In “Realism and Reason”, these consist in making
verified observational sentences come out true.19 But SAT will also
satisfy the operational constraints. For verified observational sen-
tences will undoubtedly be part of an epistemically ideal theory, and
hence, by hypothesis, will be made true by SAT.
Thus SAT satisfies theoretical and operational constraints. Hence,
unless the proponent of MR can invoke further constraints, he won’t
be able to make sense of the idea that SAT is not the reference-
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determining relation. And for Putnam this is precisely the situation.
No other constraints could be legitimately imposed on the relation
that determines the satisfaction conditions of terms.
For his critics, however, this restriction is totally unjustified. It
amounts to requiring that the satisfaction conditions of terms have
to be determined by the truth values of the sentences in which they
figure.20 But there seems to be room in principle for accounts of how
satisfaction conditions are determined in which the truth conditions
of sentences play only a limited role, or no role whatsoever. This
would be the situation, in particular, if the relation that determines
satisfaction conditions were a causal relation.
Let me use the label externalism for the view that the facts
that determine which correspondence is the reference relation are
at least partly independent of the truth values that each correspon-
dence would assign to sentences or beliefs. So long as externalism
is a live option, it would seem possible for the proponent of MR
to maintain that SAT is not the relation that determines satisfaction
conditions, and hence that the ideal theory could be false.
Putnam has offered several lines of argument to undermine exter-
nalism. If he succeeded in this endeavour, he would establish the
entailment from MR to the impossibility of an epistemically ideal
theory that is objectively false. Nevertheless, as we have seen above,
this result wouldn’t by itself force the proponent of MR to reject his
picture of reference. He could save it if he were willing to give up
the claim that the ideal theory could be false. We still haven’t got
an argument for the claim that if externalism had to be abandoned,
MR would fall with it. I shall argue in the next section that such an
argument can be found elsewhere in Putnam’s writings. Then I shall
turn to considering Putnam’s reasons for rejecting externalism.
3. PERMUTATION
Thus, according to Putnam, the only legitimate way of singling out
the relation that determines the satisfaction conditions of terms is
with constraints on the truth values that would result for the sen-
tences in which they figure. We could demand, e.g., that a successful
candidate should make the ideal theory come out true. As we have
seen, one problem with this proposal is that it makes the thought that
226 JOS ´E L. ZALABARDO
the ideal theory might be false totally unintelligible. But Putnam’s
restriction has another consequence that is more directly damaging
for MR. The problem, highlighted in Chapter 2 of Reason, Truth and
History, is that for any consistent theory T and any domain S of the
right size, there will be, not just one, but many different assignments
of extensions in S to the terms that figure in T, each of which would
make T come out true. Thus, in particular, there will be many assign-
ments of extensions in THE WORLD to the terms of the ideal theory
that would make it come out true. This result is reached through
the permutation argument. Given an assignment of extensions in
THE WORLD to the terms of T that makes the theory come out true,
any automorphism of the objects of THE WORLD would generate a
different assignment that also satisfies this condition. If the world
contains infinitely many objects, infinitely many assignments can be
generated in this manner, all of which would make T come out true.21
This means that, so long as Putnam’s restriction is in place, we won’t
be able to single out a unique relation as the one that determines the
satisfaction conditions of terms. But the existence of such a relation
is the central tenet of MR. Therefore, if Putnam’s restriction can be
upheld, MR will have to be rejected.
We now have the argument we were looking for. If externalism
had to be rejected, MR would have to go with it. This connection is
now widely accepted,22 but while Putnam expects it to undermine
MR, most other writers have taken it the other way round, as lending
support to externalism.23 This is due to the fact that Putnam’s argu-
ments against externalism have carried very little conviction. The
remainder of this paper will be devoted to exploring the possibility
of a cogent argument against the externalist version of MR. I shall
first take a brief look at three lines of argument that can be discerned
in Putnam’s writings. Then I shall articulate a different argument by
developing a reinterpretation of the basic thought behind Putnam’s
rejection of externalism.
4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXTERNALISM
According to externalism, there is a relation, call it R, partly indepen-
dent of the truth values of sentences, whose instantiation conditions
determine the satisfaction conditions of each term. A term t is sat-
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isfied by an object a if and only if t bears R to a. Putnam briefly
considers this proposal, and dismisses it on the grounds that such an
‘external’ constraint would be nothing but a theoretical constraint
under disguise.24 Thus the externalist argues that the satisfaction
relation is the one that pairs each term with the objects to which it is
R-related. But for Putnam this is indistinguishable from a theoretical
constraint: the relation that determines satisfaction conditions has
to be such as to make the following sentence come out true: ‘x is
satisfied by y iff R(x, y)’.
Critics have objected that this reply rests on a sort of use-mention
confusion.25 It is one thing to single out the satisfaction relation as
the one that pairs each term with the objects to which it is R-related,
and quite another to single it out as the one that makes a sentence
come out true. As Putnam has shown, many candidate satisfaction
relations would make the sentence ‘x is satisfied by y iff R(x, y)’
come out true, but it doesn’t follow from this that R isn’t a perfectly
determinate relation that each term bears to a unique class of objects.
Putnam has protested that, in raising this objection,
[: : : ] the philosopher is ignoring his own epistemological position. He is philos-
ophizing as if naive realism were true of him (or, equivalently, as if he and he
alone were in an absolute relation to the world). What he calls causation really
is causation, and of course there is a fixed, somehow singled-out, correspondence
between the world and one definite relation in his case. Or so he assumes. But
how this can be so was just the question at issue.26
As we shall see presently, a version of this thought may ultimately
constitute a legitimate complaint against the metaphysical realist
position. But, as it stands, Putnam’s rejoinder seems to miss an
important point. The externalist proposal is not trying to establish
that terms have a determinate extension. Its goal is to specify how
extensions are fixed. And the nature of the enterprise crucially affects
the rules of the game. As Carsten Hansen has put it,
[i]n the context of giving an account of the means by which our terms acquire
determinate extensions there can be nothing in assuming that the language in
which the account is given has a determinate interpretation. No attempt to explain
how extensions are fixed could fail by begging the question whether language has
a determinate interpretation, and this is what Putnam’s objection amounts to.27
A second line of argument is expressed by Putnam’s protest: “It
seems as if the fact that R is reference must be a metaphysically
unexplainable fact, a kind of primitive, surd, metaphysical truth”.28
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The main difficulty with this thought is that if it were a fact that
reference is R, it wouldn’t seem to be more surd or metaphysically
unexplainable than perfectly respectable facts such as the fact that
water is H2O. In fact, proponents of physicalistic theories of refer-
ence seem to conceive of their enterprise as analogous to any other
scientific explication of a pre-theoretical notion.29 Putnam sees a
disanalogy. He writes:
if there is a determinate physicalistic relation R [: : : ] which just is reference [: : : ],
this fact [unlike the fact that water is H2O] cannot itself be the consequence of our
intentions to refer; rather, [: : : ] it enters into determining what our very intentions
to refer signify.30
But even if this is correct, and the fact that reference is R has to be
construed as a brute metaphysical fact that transcends our referential
intentions, this admission need not force the externalist to abandon
his position. As Mark Heller puts it,
[t]he mere bruteness of the fact should not intimidate the externalist. It seems likely
to me that the externalist is going to have to accept some brute facts anyway. It
seems to be a primitive, unexplainable fact that modus ponens is valid. Perhaps
the same should be said of the laws of nature. Why should we not hold that the
fact that R is reference [: : : ] is also primitive?31
Another family of arguments advanced by Putnam target, not
externalism as such, but rather the availability of a plausible account
of the nature of the relation that, according to MR, links each term
with the objects that satisfy it. These arguments grant that if a true
sentence of the form ‘x refers to y iff R(x, y)’ were available, exter-
nalism could be vindicated, but attack the plausibility of the most
promising strategies for instantiating this schema. They target, in
particular, the attempt to reduce reference to causal-nomological
notions.32 I shall not be concerned with these arguments here. I
believe that the difficulties faced by causal-nomological accounts
of reference at this level are indeed formidable.33 But these diffi-
culties do not reveal what, if anything, is wrong with the externalist
framework as such. In spite of recent attempts to construe the model-
theoretic considerations as a challenge of this kind,34 it is hard to
deny that, for Putnam, the externalist version of MR rests on a fun-
damental mistake. My goal in what follows will be to develop an
argument that would, if successful, vindicate this intuition.
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5. A BETTER ARGUMENT?
In Reason, Truth and History, Putnam presents the intuitive thought
behind his rejection of MR. As we have seen, in Chapter 2 of this
book he tries to undermine MR on the grounds that “even if we fix
the theory and fix the objects there are (if the number of objects is
infinite) infinitely many different ways in which the same objects
can be used to make a model for a given theory”.35 “This”, he adds,
“simply states in mathematical language the intuitive fact that to
single out a correspondence between two domains one needs some
independent access to both domains”.36 The problem with MR is
that
[t]o pick out just one correspondence between words or mental signs and mind-
independent things we would have already to have referential access to the mind-
independent things. You can’t single out a correspondence between two things
by just squeezing one of them hard (or doing anything else to just one of them);
you cannot single out a correspondence between our concepts and the supposed
noumenal objects without access to the noumenal objects.37
Let’s focus on concepts or mental representations.38 The crucial
difficulty for MR seems to arise from the fact that we cannot single
out the correspondence that, according to MR, determines the satis-
faction conditions of our concepts.
There is a way of understanding the notion of singling out a corre-
spondence according to which Putnam’s thought clearly fails to put
pressure on externalism. Thus suppose that, by ‘singling out a corre-
spondence as the satisfaction relation’, Putnam meant making it the
case that that correspondence is the one that determines satisfaction
conditions.39 Then the externalist would agree with Putnam. We,
with our theories, cannot make it the case that a certain correspon-
dence is the one that determines satisfaction conditions. Reference
facts, the externalist would urge, cannot arise from internal con-
straints alone.
If this is Putnam’s reason for rejecting MR, the externalist seems
to be right in thinking that he is over-reacting. That internal con-
straints don’t fix reference does not entail that nothing does. Perhaps
external constraints do. Nothing in this reading of Putnam’s thought
seems to preclude this possibility. But there is another way of under-
standing the notion of singling out a correspondence that results in
a more promising line of argument. Suppose that by ‘singling out
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a correspondence as the satisfaction relation’, Putnam didn’t mean
making it the case that that correspondence determines satisfac-
tion conditions, but rather grasping this fact. On this construal of the
notion, the passage quoted above would suggest a different difficulty
for MR. Putnam would not be questioning directly the metaphysical
realist thesis that reference facts are determined by a correspondence
between all our concepts and things in the mind-independent world.
On this reading, the problem would be that if this were the way in
which reference facts are determined, it wouldn’t be possible for us
to grasp them – we wouldn’t be able to grasp facts concerning which
objects of the mind-independent world satisfy each of our concepts.
In what follows, I want to explore the possibility of reading Putnam’s
arguments as aiming to establish this conclusion. I shall contend that
his basic thoughts can be naturally construed as undermining the
most plausible accounts of how we could grasp the referential con-
nections postulated by MR. Let me emphasise that I am not making
any claim to exegetical accuracy. My goal is not to be faithful to
Putnam’s own intentions, but to develop an argument against MR
that seems to be suggested by some of the things he says.
It will save us some confusion to conduct the discussion in the
third person, by considering the conditions under which a subject,
call him Peter, would grasp the satisfaction conditions of his con-
cepts. Peter’s system of mental representation will include the
resources of first-order logic plus a repertoire of general and individu-
al concepts. I shall avoid committing myself to any specific account
of the nature of these mental symbols, and stipulate that they are
letters of the Latin alphabet – lower-case letters in the case of singu-
lar concepts, upper-case letters in the case of general concepts.40 I
shall form names for Peter’s concepts and for the beliefs that can be
formed with them by enclosing them in single quotation marks.41 It
will also help clarify matters to differentiate between Peter’s repre-
sentational resources and our own. For this purpose, I, unlike Peter,
shall use letters of the Greek alphabet to refer to objects, properties
and relations in the mind-independent world – lower-case letters for
objects, upper-case letters for properties and relations.
I propose to assume that MR is the right account of the reference of
Peter’s concepts. Thus, I shall assume that there is a correspondence,
, that pairs each of Peter’s concepts with the object or set of objects
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by which it is satisfied. The question that we need to consider is
how Peter would go about in trying to grasp the fact that each of his
concepts is satisfied by the objects to which it is -related.
6. DIRECT GRASP OF REFERENCE FACTS
What could grasp of reference facts consist in? One natural thought
is that the way to grasp a fact is to form a belief that represents it.42
On this account, all I need to do in order to grasp the fact that John
is taller than Mary is to form a belief that represents the fact that
John bears this relation to Mary. Similarly, all I would need to do in
order to grasp the fact that ‘John’ refers to John is to form a belief
that represents the fact that ‘John’ bears this relation to John.
We need to say a little bit at this point about the relation of
representation between beliefs and facts. It is natural to suppose that
this relation is closely connected with the truth conditions of beliefs.
In order for a belief B to represent a fact F, the obtaining or otherwise
of F will have to determine the truth value of B, i.e. B will have to be
true if F obtains and false if it fails to obtain. It is widely admitted that
this is a necessary condition for a belief to represent a fact. Treating it
also as a sufficient condition raises familiar problems. But I propose
to waive these and work with a truth-conditional account of which
fact is represented by each belief, since my arguments will not trade
on the controversial features of this account.43
Thus the proposal is that the way to grasp a reference fact is
to form a belief that represents it. Let’s consider how Peter could
pursue this strategy. Let ‘a’ be one of Peter’s singular concepts, and
let  be the object to which it refers. According to this proposal, in
order to grasp the fact that ‘a’ refers to , Peter would have to form a
belief that represents it, i.e., on my working construal of the notion,
a belief that is true if ‘a’ refers to  and false if it doesn’t. Similarly,
let ‘P’ be one of Peter’s monadic general concepts that is satisfied
by the instances of a property, . In order to grasp the fact that ‘P’
is satisfied by the instances of , Peter would have to form a belief
that is true if ‘P’ is satisfied precisely by these objects and false if it
isn’t.44
In order for Peter to be able to form these beliefs, we need to
endow him with a minimal repertoire of semantic concepts, consist-
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ing of two items. On the one hand, he will need a way of referring to
his own concepts – i.e. a device of ‘mental quotation’ that enables
him to form, for each of his concepts, a singular concept that refers
to it. I have been using (single) quotation marks to form singular
terms that refer to Peter’s concepts. But just as I am differentiat-
ing between Peter’s ‘first order’ referential devices (letters from the
Latin alphabet) and my own (letters from the Greek alphabet), I pro-
pose to differenciate between his meta-linguistic referential devices
and mine. For this purpose, instead of using quotation marks, Peter
will refer to one of his concepts by enclosing it in square brackets.
Thus ‘[c]’ will be Peter’s singular concept that refers to his own
concept ‘c’.45 On the other hand, he will need a binary concept that
is satisfied by a concept and an object or tuple just in case the object
or tuple satisfies the concept. The same considerations that I have
adduced to motivate the use of square brackets recommend the intro-
duction of a conventional symbol to represent this binary concept. I
shall use ‘SAT’ for this purpose.
With these resources at his disposal, Peter can form beliefs that
represent the satisfaction conditions of his concepts. Thus let ‘b’
be a singular concept of Peter’s which refers to . Then the belief
‘SAT([a], b)’ will represent the fact that ‘a’ refers to . Similarly
the fact that ‘P’ is satisfied by the instances of  will be represented
by the belief ‘(8x)(SAT([P], x) $ Q(x))’, where ‘Q’ is a monadic
general concept that is satisfied by the instances of . I would like
to consider next whether forming beliefs of this form would enable
Peter to succeed in grasping the satisfaction conditions of his con-
cepts.
7. THE VEIL OF CONCEPTS
In the passages quoted in Section 5 above, Putnam provides an
explanation of why we can’t single out a correspondence between
concepts and objects. The reason is, in his view, that we have no
independent access to objects. In “Realism and Reason” he briefly
explains why objects are not independently accessible:
If concepts are particulars (‘signs’), then any concept we may have of the relation
between a sign and its object is another sign. But it is unintelligible, from my point
of view, how the sort of relation the metaphysical realist envisages as holding
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between a sign and its object can be singled out either by holding up the sign itself
[: : : ] or by holding up yet another sign [: : : ].46
Putnam’s thought can be construed as an attack on the proposal that
we are considering – that a subject can grasp the fact that one of
his concepts, C, is satisfied by a class of objects by forming a belief
that represents this fact. On this construal, Putnam’s objection to this
proposal is that such a belief would use concepts in order to represent
this fact about concept C. In particular, it would use concepts to single
out the objects that it pairs with C as its satisfaction conditions.
Consider Peter’s attempt to grasp the fact that ‘a’ refers to  by
forming the belief ‘SAT([a], b)’. This belief represents the fact that
Peter is trying to grasp – the fact that one of his concepts bears a
certain relation to an object. But it does so by singling out each of
the relata, and indeed the relation itself, by means of concepts. In
particular, the object that it pairs with ‘a’ as its referent is singled
out by virtue of the fact that it is the referent of another one of
Peter’s concepts, namely ‘b’. On my construal of Putnam’s thought,
the problem faced by this strategy for grasping reference facts arises
from the involvement of concepts in the belief that represents the
satisfaction conditions of a concept.
To see why this is a problem, we need to consider what makes us
think that forming, say, the belief ‘SAT([a], b)’ would enable Peter
to grasp the fact that ‘a’ refers to . A natural explanation is that
this belief would enable him to derive a grasp of the satisfaction
conditions of ‘a’ from his grasp of the satisfaction conditions of
‘b’. We normally take for granted that subjects have a grasp of the
satisfaction conditions of the concepts that figure in their beliefs.
Hence, if Peter can form the belief ‘SAT([a], b)’, we assume that he
has a grasp of the satisfaction conditions of the concepts that figure
in it, including ‘b’. By forming this belief, Peter will generate a grasp
of the fact that ‘a’ is satisfied by  out of his grasp of the fact that ‘b’
is satisfied by . On this account, if Peter didn’t antecedently grasp
the fact that ‘b’ is satisfied by , forming the belief ‘SAT([a], b)’
wouldn’t enable him to grasp the fact that ‘a’ is satisfied by . Hence
this proposal as to how Peter can grasp the satisfaction conditions
of ‘a’ presupposes that he has a grasp of the satisfaction conditions
of ‘b’.
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This presupposition will have to be discharged sooner or later. We
are looking for an account of how Peter can grasp the fact that each
of his concepts is satisfied by the objects to which it is-related. An
account of how he can attain this goal cannot presuppose that he has
grasp of the satisfaction conditions of some of his concepts. It has
to explain how he can achieve grasp of the satisfaction conditions of
all of them.
It is this need for generality that poses a difficulty for the pro-
posal under consideration. As we have seen, by forming the belief
‘SAT([a], b)’, Peter can grasp the fact that ‘a’ refers to , provided
that he grasps the fact that ‘b’ refers to . He could attain grasp of
the latter fact by the same strategy. If ‘c’ is another one of Peter’s
concepts that refers to , and he grasps the fact that it does, then
he could grasp the fact that ‘b’ refers to  by forming the belief
‘SAT([b], c)’.
But it seems obvious that this cannot be the general account of
how Peter grasps the satisfaction conditions of his concepts. This
method can only be used for deriving grasp of the satisfaction con-
ditions of some concepts from grasp of the satisfaction conditions
of others. In the end, a basic stock of concepts has to be reached
whose satisfaction conditions Peter grasps by other means. Thus on
the standard construal of his argument, Putnam’s contention is that
concepts can’t in general obtain their satisfaction conditions from
beliefs, as a belief that attempts to fix the satisfaction conditions of
a concept will involve other concepts, whose satisfaction conditions
will also have to be fixed. On the construal that I am recommending,
the claim is that the satisfaction conditions of concepts cannot in
general be grasped by means of beliefs, as a belief with which we try
to grasp the satisfaction conditions of a concept will involve other
concepts, whose satisfaction conditions we also need to grasp.
8. JUST MORE THEORY? I: TARSKIAN THEORIES OF REFERENCE
It may seem, however, that Peter could use this strategy to better
effect. One could grant that it will take him nowhere to try to
derive grasp of the satisfaction conditions of ‘a’ from grasp of
the satisfaction conditions of other concepts, unless the chain ends
with some concepts whose satisfaction conditions Peter grasps non-
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derivatively. But instead of chasing grasp of the satisfaction condi-
tions of concepts around his conceptual repertoire in this manner,
couldn’t he try to form a set of beliefs that enables him to grasp the
satisfaction conditions of all his concepts at once?
One way of carrying out this strategy would be to form what I
propose to call a Tarskian theory of reference. This theory contains,
for every singular concept ‘c’, the belief ‘SAT([c], c)’, and for every
monadic general concept ‘C’, the belief ‘(8x)(SAT([C], x)$C(x))’,
as well as similar beliefs for each of his relational and functional
concepts. I want to consider whether by forming this theory Peter
would come to grasp the fact that each of his concepts is satisfied
by the objects to which it is -related. This would require that the
theory represents this fact. On my construal of the notion of fact-
representation, this would require, in turn, that the theory is true if
the fact obtains, and false if it fails to obtain.
Peter’s Tarskian theory of reference would seem to satisfy this
constraint. Consider, e.g., the belief ‘SAT([a], a)’. We are assuming
that  is the satisfaction relation. One could argue that, on this
assumption, if  is the object to which ‘a’ is-related, Peter’s belief
‘SAT([a], a)’ would be true if  satisfies ‘a’, and false otherwise.
Similarly, if ‘P’ is-related to the instances of property, the belief
‘(8x)(SAT([P], x) $ P(x))’ would be true if ‘P’ is satisfied by the
members of , and false otherwise. Thus, taken as a whole, Peter’s
Tarskian theory of reference would be true if each of his concepts
is satisfied by the objects to which it is -related, and false if these
aren’t the satisfaction conditions of Peter’s concepts.
Let’s suppose for the moment that this is correct – that Peter’s
Tarskian theory of reference is true if  is the satisfaction relation,
and false if it isn’t. I want to suggest that conceding this point
doesn’t force us to accept that Peter has now grasped the fact that
 is the satisfaction relation. True, he now has the belief ‘SAT ([a],
a)’, and we are assuming that this belief represents the fact that ‘a’
is satisfied by . But we saw before that the natural explanation
of why a belief of the form ‘SAT([c1], c2)’ would enable Peter to
grasp the satisfaction conditions of ‘c1’ is that such a belief would
enable him to derive this grasp from his grasp of the satisfaction
conditions of ‘c2’. Hence ‘SAT([c1], c2)’ would enable Peter to grasp
the satisfaction conditions of ‘c1’ only if he already grasped the
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satisfaction conditions of ‘c2’. On this account of why beliefs of
this form can bring about grasp of the satisfaction conditions of
concepts, a ‘disquotational’ belief such as ‘SAT([a], a)’ would fail
to discharge this task. For forming this belief would enable Peter to
grasp the satisfaction conditions of ‘a’ only if he already grasped
them. Thus Peter’s Tarskian theory of reference may represent the
fact that  is the satisfaction relation, but in his attempt to grasp
this fact, the theory will be either unnecessary or ineffectual. If, on
the one hand, Peter has no grasp of the satisfaction conditions of his
concepts, forming this theory won’t enable him to grasp them. If, on
the other hand, he has grasped them already, the theory is no longer
needed for the job. Either way, Peter’s Tarskian theory of reference
doesn’t constitute grasp of the fact that  is the satisfaction relation.
The proponent of MR may protest that this conclusion has only
been reached by sneaking through the back door extra conditions
on when a subject can be said to have grasped a fact. I accepted
some time ago that a subject can grasp a fact by forming a belief
that represents it. Now I have concluded that Peter’s Tarskian theory
of reference wouldn’t enable him to grasp the fact that  is the
satisfaction relation, even after granting that the theory represents
this fact. This outcome shows that somewhere along the way I have
abandoned the account of grasp of facts with which I started, by
adding an extra condition on when a subject can be said to grasp a
fact.
The controversial addition arises from the requirement that if
Peter is to grasp the satisfaction conditions of a concept C by forming
a belief, he has to grasp already the satisfaction conditions of the
concept in terms of which the belief singles out the objects that it
pairs with C. Once this additional constraint is in place, forming a
belief that represents the satisfaction conditions of C may not enable
Peter to grasp them.
An externalist may want to resist this constraint. He could argue
that it amounts to requiring that in order to grasp the fact that ‘a’
refers to , Peter would have to form a belief that represents this fact
and grasp the further fact that  is the object that the belief ascribes
to ‘a’ as its referent. In general, the externalist would contend, I am
requiring that in order to grasp a fact F, a subject has to satisfy two
conditions:
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(a) Form a belief B that represents F.
(b) Grasp the fact that B represents F.
It is the second condition that generates the problem. For it entails
that grasping a fact requires grasping another fact. Hence any attempt
to grasp a fact, semantic or otherwise, will be rendered impossible
by the ensuing regress.
The externalist could try to avoid the difficulty by rejecting con-
dition (b), and maintaining that all one needs to do to grasp a fact is
to form a belief that represents it. In particular, Peter could grasp the
fact that  is the satisfaction relation by forming a set of beliefs that
represents this fact. Hence, if Peter’s Tarskian theory of reference
represents the fact that  is the satisfaction relation, forming this
theory is all he needs to do to grasp this fact. Just as an externalist
account of reference saved MR from the standard construal of Put-
nam’s attack, an externalist account of grasp of facts may save it
now from the version of the argument that I am recommending.
This proposal can be attacked on two fronts. On the one hand,
the account of grasp of facts that it puts forward seems extremely
implausible. It is true that we normally consider forming a belief B
that represents a fact F sufficient for grasping F. However, I want
to suggest that this is because we assume that subjects have a grasp
of what facts are represented by their beliefs, not because we think
that no such grasp is necessary. But the proponent of MR cannot
appeal to this assumption to save grasp of semantic facts from my
challenge. For it is hard to see how a subject could grasp what fact
is represented by one of his beliefs unless he had a grasp of the
satisfaction conditions of the concepts that figure in it. But I am
arguing precisely that MR would render grasp of satisfaction con-
ditions impossible. In this situation, the proponent of MR would be
begging the question if he invoked the assumption that we normally
grasp what state of affairs is represented by each of our beliefs.
The externalist proposal amounts to the claim that the existence of
a relation between a mental representation and a fact suffices for the
subject that forms this mental representation to grasp the fact, even
if the subject has no grasp of which fact the mental representation
is related to, let alone of the nature of the relation. This would be
a very striking feature for mental representations to have. Certainly
non-mental representations don’t exhibit it. The gauge pointing in
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a certain direction may represent the fact that the tank is full. But
seeing the direction in which the gauge points would only enable
you to grasp the fact that the tank is full if you grasped another fact
– that the position of the gauge represents the tank being full. The
relevance of the illustration is underscored by the fact that, in the
externalist picture, the link between the representation and the fact
that it represents is as dependent on factors external to the represen-
tation in the case of a belief as in the case of a petrol gauge. No doubt
there are important differences between seeing a petrol gauge and
forming a mental representation. But if the externalist account could
only be saved by an unsupported appeal to the sui generis charac-
ter of mental representation, it would be fair to describe the view,
adapting Putnam’s epithet, as a magical theory of grasp of facts.47
Notice that the proponent of MR cannot support the externalist
account of grasp of facts on the grounds that we seem perfectly capa-
ble of grasping facts, and only the externalist proposal can accom-
modate this possibility. I am not denying that we can grasp facts,
semantic or otherwise. My claim is rather that no such grasp would
be possible if MR were the correct account of reference. The pressure
that this result would put on MR cannot be deflected by insisting that
grasp of facts has to be possible. If accepting an implausible account
of what this grasp amounts to were the only way to save it, perhaps
we would be compelled to bite the bullet. But insofar as grasp of
facts can also be saved by giving up MR, the proponent of this pic-
ture of reference is in no position to defend the externalist account
of grasp of facts as the only way of rendering this grasp possible. In
the last section I shall address briefly the question whether giving up
MR might enable us to provide a more satisfactory account of grasp
of reference facts.
9. BLIND SPOTS
Let me now move on to consider a second difficulty with this pro-
posal. Even if we accept the externalist account of grasp of facts,
there are reasons for doubting that Peter’s Tarskian theory of refer-
ence would enable him to grasp the fact that  is the satisfaction
relation. For it is far from clear that the theory succeeds in rep-
resenting this fact. The claim that it does rests on the idea that the
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disquotational theorem corresponding to each concept represents the
fact that it is satisfied by the objects to which it is -related. Thus,
if ‘P’ is -related to the instances of , since  is the satisfaction
relation, the belief ‘(8x)(SAT([P], x) $ P(x))’ would represent the
fact that ‘P’ is satisfied by the instances of .
I want to offer a line of reasoning that seems to cast doubt on this
conception of what facts are represented by beliefs of this kind. I
am assuming that beliefs come to represent facts by virtue of their
truth conditions. A belief, B, represents a fact, F, just in case B is
true if F obtains and false if it fails to obtain. But beliefs acquire
their truth conditions by virtue of the satisfaction conditions of the
concepts that figure in them. Hence what fact is represented by a
belief is ultimately determined by the satisfaction conditions of the
concepts that figure in it. Thus given that predicate ‘P’ is satisfied
by the instances of property , and singular term ‘a’ refers to object
, the belief ‘Pa’ will be true if  is an instance of , and false if it
isn’t. By having those truth conditions, the belief comes to represent
the fact that ().
The same account can explain how one of Peter’s beliefs can
represent the satisfaction conditions of a concept. Thus given that
(a) his concept ‘Q’ is satisfied by the instances of , (b) ‘SAT’ is
satisfied by all pairs <x, y> such that x satisfies y, and (c) ‘[P]’ is
satisfied by ‘P’, the belief ‘(8x)(SAT([P], x) $ Q(x))’ will be true
if ‘P’ is satisfied by the instances of , and false if these aren’t the
satisfaction conditions of the concept. Hence the belief represents
the fact that ‘P’ is satisfied by the instances of .
Let’s consider now the situation for a disquotational theorem, such
as ‘(8x)(SAT([P], x)$ P(x))’. In light of the preceding discussion,
this belief would represent the fact that ‘P’ is satisfied by the instances
of  just in case the obtaining of this fact would make the belief
true, and its failure to obtain would make it false. However, this
is not a correct description of the truth conditions of the belief. If
the fact obtains, the belief is true, but its failure to obtain wouldn’t
make the belief false. The reason is not that the belief would still
be true in these circumstances. The reason is rather that it doesn’t
make sense to ask what truth value that situation would yield for the
belief, given the satisfaction conditions of the concepts that figure in
it. For the situation in which ‘P’ is not satisfied by the instances of
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is one in which the concepts that figure in the belief wouldn’t have
the satisfaction conditions that they actually have. Notice that the
proponent of MR cannot avoid this difficulty by evaluating the belief
by reference to the satisfaction conditions that its concepts would
have in that situation. For so long as ‘SAT’ and ‘[P]’ keep their
satisfaction conditions, the belief will continue to be true, whatever
satisfaction conditions ‘P’ happens to have.
In order for a belief to represent the fact that ‘P’ has certain
satisfaction conditions, the satisfaction conditions of the concepts
that figure in the belief have to bestow on it a truth value for each
possible state of affairs in regard of the satisfaction conditions of ‘P’
– it has to be true if ‘P’ has the satisfaction conditions that the belief
represents it as having, and false otherwise. But a disquotational
belief cannot fulfil this requirement. The satisfaction conditions of
its concepts are incapable of bestowing a truth value on the belief
for all the satisfaction conditions that ‘P’ could have. They cannot
determine the truth value that the belief would have if the satisfaction
conditions of ‘P’ were other than what they are, as ‘P’ is one of the
concepts whose satisfaction conditions are supposed to effect this
determination.
We can think of the satisfaction conditions of the concepts that
figure in a belief as a ‘scanning device’ that surveys all possible
states of affairs and bestows on the belief a truth value for each of
them. It is thanks to this device that a belief can represent a fact. If
a belief B is made true by all states of affairs in which F obtains and
false by all those in which F fails to obtain, we say that B represents
F. The problem with a disquotational belief is that the scanning
device constituted by the satisfaction conditions of its concepts has
‘blind spots’. It fails to assign a truth value to the belief for all
states of affairs in which the concept that it mentions has satisfaction
conditions other than the actual ones. This shortcoming renders the
belief incapable of representing the fact that a concept has certain
satisfaction conditions, even if we grant that the concepts that figure
in it have, as a matter of fact, determinate satisfaction conditions.
This means that even if we accept the externalist account of refer-
ence, we can resist the claim that Peter’s Tarskian theory represents
the satisfaction conditions of his concepts. For even if we grant that
 is the satisfaction relation, the theory won’t represent the fact that
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this is so. Therefore, even if we accept the externalist account of
grasp of facts, Peter’s Tarskian theory of reference won’t enable him
to grasp the satisfaction conditions of his concepts.48
10. JUST MORE THEORY? II: FIELDIAN THEORIES OF REFERENCE
Let me consider now another version of this proposal. A disquota-
tional theory is not the only kind of theory of reference that Peter
could adopt. Let’s suppose that Peter’s conceptual repertoire includes
a binary concept ‘R’ that is satisfied by a concept and an object or
tuple just in case the former bears relation  to the latter. Then Peter
could form a theory of reference along the lines of the proposal that
Putnam attributes to Field,49 by forming the belief
(F) ‘(8x)(8y)(SAT(x, y)$ R(x, y))’
Let’s consider whether forming this belief would enable Peter to
grasp the fact that  is the satisfaction relation.
As before, even if we grant that (F) represents the fact that is the
satisfaction relation, forming this belief won’t enable Peter to grasp
this fact – according to the conception of grasp of facts that I have
advocated. The theory would enable him to grasp the satisfaction
conditions of his concepts by deriving this grasp from his grasp
of the satisfaction conditions of ‘R’ – the concept with which the
theory singles out the pairs connected by the satisfaction relation.
But we are looking for a general account of how Peter could grasp
the satisfaction conditions of all his concepts. An explanation of how
he can derive from grasp of the satisfaction conditions of some of
his concepts grasp of the satisfaction conditions of all the rest does
not fit the bill. The general account that we are looking for cannot
presuppose grasp of the satisfaction conditions of any concept, but
unless we presuppose that Peter grasps the satisfaction conditions of
‘R’, his Fieldian theory of reference won’t enable him to grasp the
satisfaction conditions of the rest of his concepts.
In light of this outcome, it may be tempting once more to resort
to an externalist account of grasp of facts, according to which all
one needs to do to grasp a fact is to form a belief that represents it.
But independently of the plausibility of this account, there remains
an issue as to whether (F) succeeds in representing the fact that  is
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the satisfaction relation. I want to argue that the considerations that
block this conclusion in the case of a Tarskian theory of reference
would have the same effect for its Fieldian counterpart.
I argued in the previous section that in order to represent the
fact that  is the satisfaction relation, the satisfaction conditions of
the concepts that figure in (F) would have to confer on this belief
the following truth conditions: (F) would have to be true if the fact
obtains and false if it fails to obtain. If  is the satisfaction relation,
(F) would indeed be true. And unlike in the previous case, some
alternative hypotheses as to the identity of the satisfaction relation
would make (F) false. Thus suppose that ‘R’ were satisfied by the
pairs that instantiate, but some other of Peter’s concepts failed to be
satisfied by the objects to which they bear. In those circumstances,
the satisfaction conditions of the concepts that figure in (F) would
make the belief false. But there still remain other hypotheses for
which the satisfaction conditions of the concepts that figure in (F)
would fail to confer a truth value on it – namely if the satisfaction
relation failed to pair ‘R’ with the instances of . These hypotheses
constitute blind spots for the satisfaction conditions of the concepts
that figure in (F).
Hence, as in the case of a Tarskian theory, a Fieldian theory
of reference fails to be related to the fact that  is the satisfaction
relation in the way that would enable it to represent this fact. For even
though the obtaining of the fact would make the theory true, its failure
to obtain would not suffice in general for making the theory false.
The inability to represent the fact that  is the satisfaction relation
doesn’t afflict disquotational theories alone. The problem arises for
every attempt to specify the satisfaction conditions of a class of
concepts C with beliefs that include some of the concepts in C.
And since any specification that Peter can provide of the satisfaction
conditions of all his concepts is bound to exhibit this feature, the
difficulty will thwart all his attempts to form a belief that represents
the fact that his concepts are satisfied by the objects to which they
are -related.50 Hence, we have to conclude that the identity of the
reference relation postulated by MR cannot be grasped by forming
beliefs that represent it.
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11. IMPLICIT THEORIES OF REFERENCE
I turn now to a different proposal as to how Peter could grasp the
fact that  is the satisfaction relation. There is another way in which
beliefs can generate grasp of reference facts. Even if we presuppose
no grasp of the satisfaction conditions of any of his concepts, there
are some reference facts that Peter can be said to grasp thanks to his
beliefs. Suppose that his theory of the world contains the following
(true) belief: ‘(8x)(P1(x) ! P2(x))’, where ‘P1’ is satisfied by the
instances of property 1, and ‘P2’ by the instances of property 2.
If he grasps the satisfaction conditions of one of the concepts that
figure in it, this belief would enable Peter to grasp reference facts
concerning the other concept. Provided that he grasps the satisfaction
conditions of ‘P1’, forming this belief would enable him to grasp a
fact about the satisfaction conditions of ‘P2’ – namely that it is
satisfied (at least) by all the instances of 1. Similarly, if he grasps
the satisfaction conditions of ‘P2’, the belief will enable him to
grasp the fact that ‘P1’ is satisfied only by instances of 2. Thus, he
grasp of reference facts that the belief would effect in this manner
presupposes a pre-existent grasp of other reference facts.
There is, however, another reference fact which Peter could be
said to grasp by forming this belief even if we presupposed no grasp
of the satisfaction conditions of ‘P1’ or ‘P2’: namely the fact that
all the objects that satisfy ‘P1’ (whatever they are) also satisfy ‘P2’.
In general, by forming a belief, Peter can be said to grasp the fact
that the satisfaction conditions of the concepts that figure in it are
such as to make the belief true. This suggests a way in which Peter
can use his beliefs to grasp the identity of the satisfaction relation.
According to this proposal, Peter could grasp the fact that  is the
satisfaction relation by forming a theory of the world that would be
true only if the satisfaction conditions of his concepts were the ones
that  ascribes to them.
Obviously, not any theory would satisfy this constraint. On the one
hand, Peter’s theory of the world would fail to satisfy the constraint
if it contained false beliefs. For, since the satisfaction conditions of
his concepts are the ones that  ascribes to them, a false theory
is made false by these satisfaction conditions. On the other hand,
Peter’s theory of the world would fail to satisfy the constraint if it
were incomplete – if there were beliefs that could be formed with his
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concepts such that neither they nor their negations were contained in
the theory. For in this case there would be more than one assignment
of satisfaction conditions to his concepts that would render his theory
true. Thus, suppose that Peter’s theory of the world contains neither
the belief ‘(8x)(P1(x)! P2(x))’ nor its negation. Then if his theory
is made true by a correspondence that pairs ‘P1’ with a subset of
the set of objects with which it pairs ‘P2’, it will also be made true
by another correspondence that differs from this one only in this
respect. Hence a true but incomplete theory of the world would not
enable Peter to grasp the fact that  is the satisfaction relation, but
only the fact that this role is played by one of the correspondences
in a range that includes , but also other candidates.
It may seem, however, that a true complete theory of the world
would enable Peter to grasp the fact that is the satisfaction relation.
If this suggestion were correct, it would be possible after all to
grasp the identity of the satisfaction relation by forming beliefs.
But the proposal falls prey to Putnam’s permutation argument. If
Peter’s theory of the world is true, the satisfaction conditions that
 ascribes to his concepts will make it true. But even though it is a
complete theory,  is far from being the only correspondence that
assigns satisfaction conditions to Peter’s concepts in such a way
as to make his theory come out true. Any automorphism on the
objects of THE WORLD would enable us to obtain from  another
correspondence that would also make the theory come out true.
Hence even a complete theory will exhibit the shortcoming that we
found in incomplete theories. It wouldn’t enable Peter to grasp the
fact that  is the satisfaction relation, but only the fact that this role
is played by one of the correspondence within a range that includes,
along with  (if the theory is true), many other correspondences.
This result wouldn’t be altered if Peter’s true, complete non-
semantic theory of the world were supplemented with a Tarskian
theory of reference for his concepts. Supplementing his theory of the
world in this way won’t improve Peter’s situation. For the seman-
tically enriched theory will be made true by the same assignments
of satisfaction conditions as the original theory.51 Hence, as before,
we would be forced to conclude that the new theory only enables
Peter to grasp the fact that the satisfaction relation is one of the
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correspondences within a range that includes many other candidates
besides .
What if Peter supplemented his theory of the world with a Fiel-
dian theory of reference? On the face of it, this enlargement of
Peter’s theory would not be as ineffectual as the previous one. A
non-semantic theory plus a Tarskian theory of reference would be
made true by all the assignments of satisfaction conditions that make
the non-semantic theory true. Adding a Fieldian theory of reference
to a non-semantic theory would not have this disappointing result.
Some of the assignments of satisfaction conditions that make the
non-semantic theory true would make the non-semantic theory and
the Fieldian theory come out false. However, the addition of a true
Fieldian theory of reference to a true, complete non-semantic theory
will still fail to be made true by  alone. There will remain sev-
eral other assignments of satisfaction conditions that also make the
expanded theory come out true. They will include every correspon-
dence X that makes the non-semantic theory come out true and is
such that X(x, y) iff X(‘R’, <x, y>).  satisfies this constraint, but
once again any automorphism on the objects of THE WORLD will
yield another correspondence that also satisfies it.
Each version of this proposal is undermined by the fact that “even
if we fix the theory and fix the objects there are (if the number of
objects is infinite) infinitely many different ways in which the same
objects can be used to make a model for a given theory”. The satisfac-
tion relation cannot be singled out by a theory as the correspondence
that would make the theory come out true. For even if it is true and
complete, and even if it incorporates a theory of reference for its own
concepts, there will always be several correspondences that make it
come out true.
12. IMMEDIACY
One could try to side-step these difficulties by denying that our grasp
of reference facts always has to be mediated by concepts. According
to this proposal, a belief that ascribes to a concept C its satisfaction
conditions could single out the objects that it pairs with C without
the intervention of concepts. By what other means could a belief
single out a class of objects? The answer provided by the empiricist
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tradition appeals to the direct, unmediated perceptual acquaintance
with objects that results from acts of ostension.
The most direct difficulty for this proposal arises from its limited
range of applicability. In some version of the idea, we only enjoy
this kind of immediate access to our sense impressions. In others,
mid-size physical objects in our surroundings are also accessible in
this manner. But wherever one draws the line, the privileged range of
objects is bound to be a relatively insignificant fraction of the class
of objects with which our concepts can be referentially connected.
And grasp of whether our concepts are satisfied by objects outside
the privileged range will have to be derived from grasp of their
satisfaction conditions within the range.
The standard account of how this derivation proceeds appeals to
the links established by our theory of the world between the sat-
isfaction of concepts by observable and unobservable objects. By
virtue of these links, our theory is supposed to generate grasp of
the referential connections that our concepts bear to unobservable
objects from our directly acquired grasp of their referential connec-
tions to observable ones. It does so by ruling out the correspondences
between our concepts and unobservable objects that would render
the theory false, given the facts concerning which observable objects
satisfy each of our concepts. Hence, on this account, we would be
able to grasp the identity of the satisfaction relation by forming a
theory that would only be made true by the correspondence that
plays as a matter of fact this role.
But this strategy is invalidated by the difficulties that I consid-
ered in the previous section. For even if the referential connections
between our concepts and observable objects are fixed, there will
always remain many assignments of unobservable objects to our
concepts that would make a given theory true. In particular, if a
theory is made true by , it will also be made true by any oth-
er correspondence that results from  by an automorphism on the
unobservable objects of THE WORLD.52
It is not clear, in any case, that referential links to ostensible
objects should be treated as unproblematic. For it is hard to see
how we could grasp which object is singled out by an ostensive
gesture without producing a mental representation of it. And the task
of grasping the satisfaction conditions of this representation would
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seem to face the same difficulties that I have considered for concepts
in general.53 If grasp of the objects singled out by ostensive gestures
is also mediated by mental representations, then these become more
grist for the permutation mill. Forming a belief such as ‘This is a
pen’ would only enable me to grasp the following reference fact –
that the object to which the demonstrative concept refers is one of
the objects that satisfies the concept ‘pen’.
13. NECESSARY TRANSCENDENCE
Let’s suppose, in any case, that the conclusion cannot be resisted
– that the proponent of MR is forced to accept that if his picture
of reference is correct, we cannot grasp reference facts. Would the
acceptance of this outcome force him to abandon MR? This is a com-
plicated question. For it may turn out that, in spite of this corollary,
MR is still the best account of reference to which we can aspire. I
shall not try to reach a verdict on this matter here, but I would like to
end by considering two ways in which the proponent of MR might
try to make this outcome more palatable than it may seem.
First, he could contend that this corollary is not as disastrous
as one may think. There is nothing wrong, he would argue, with
reference relations of which we have no grasp. In fact, the standard
anti-individualist thought experiments seem to suggest that the phe-
nomenon is widespread.54 Someone who doesn’t have the concepts
of modern chemistry may not be able to represent the respects in
which H2O differs from XYZ. But someone with this conceptual
deficit can perfectly well refer to H2O, and not to XYZ by his con-
cept ‘water’. The proponent of MR could argue that a subject in
this situation has no grasp of the fact that his concept ‘water’ refers
to H2O, and not to XYZ. But this is the situation in which we find
ourselves with respect to many of our concepts. Hence, quite inde-
pendently of MR, we would seem forced to conclude that our con-
cepts often bear referential relations to the world of which we have no
grasp.
This observation, the proponent of MR would point out, makes it
easier to accept the consequence that I have drawn from his position.
Even if we reject MR, we would have to accept that subjects often
have no grasp of the referential connections between their concepts
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and the world. In light of this fact, that MR forces us to accept this
situation across the board doesn’t seem a formidable liability.
Let’s grant that the proponent of MR is right in his interpretation
of anti-individualist thought experiments. I want to suggest that the
consequence that I have drawn from MR is much harder to accept
than any limitation on our grasp of reference facts that one could
derive from anti-individualist considerations. What makes MR unap-
pealing is not just the number of concepts for which this situation
would have to be accepted. There is a crucial disanalogy between
the situation faced by a chemically illiterate subject with respect
to his concept ‘water’ and the situation that Peter would face with
respect to each of his concepts if MR were correct. The disanalogy
lies in the fact that the former situation is in principle remediable.
The chemically illiterate subject could come to grasp the fact that
his concept refers to H2O, and not to XYZ, if he acquired the con-
cepts of modern chemistry. Armed with these concepts, he would be
capable of forming a belief that would rule out XYZ as a referent of
his concept ‘water’.
In this respect, Peter’s situation is totally different. As we have
seen, the permutation argument enables us to obtain a correspon-
dence, call it *, that assigns the same truth values as  to every
belief that can be formed with Peter’s concepts. If and* assigned
different truth values to beliefs formed with concepts that Peter does-
n’t yet have, then acquiring these concepts would put him in a posi-
tion to rule out *. But this is not the end of the story, as, for any set
of concepts that Peter could acquire, and any theory that he could
form with them, the permutation argument would enable us to find a
correspondence that would assign the same truth value as  to every
belief in the theory.
The transcendence of reference facts that follows from MR is
not a contingent shortcoming due to the specific cognitive repertoire
available to a subject at a certain time. MR makes reference facts
necessarily transcendent. No improvement in the representational
tools at Peter’s disposal will enable him to form a theory that is
made true by  alone. There will always remain other assignments
of satisfaction conditions that would also make his theory come out
true.
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14. REJECTING MR
Let me now turn to a second way in which the proponent of MR may
attempt to save his picture of reference in the face of the argument
that I have developed. He could agree that the transcendence of
reference facts is an intolerable result, but question the claim that
his picture of reference is to be blamed. According to this line of
thought, the problem that I have raised would be inherent to the
notion of reference. Nothing short of abandoning the notion would
make the problem go away.
Naturally, the problem can only be shrugged off in this manner if
there is no account of reference for which it doesn’t arise. And this is
by no means a foregone conclusion. I am not going to try to present
a satisfactory alternative here, but I would like to end by pointing
in the direction of an approach to reference that may succeed in
avoiding this difficulty. I am going to illustrate this approach by
looking at the semantics of arithmetical terms. In his classical paper,
“What Numbers Could Not Be”, Paul Benacerraf attacked the idea
that a reduction of arithmetic to set theory would reveal the real
nature of numbers. According to the view that Benacerraf attacked,
numbers are sets – the elements of a certain set-theoretic sequence.
This proposal can also be presented as an account of the reference of
arithmetical terms. Numerals, on this account, would refer to the sets
of a certain sequence, and the satisfaction conditions of arithmetical
predicates, relation symbols and function symbols would also be
defined on this sequence of sets.
Consider now Jane, a subject who has arithmetical concepts, but
no set-theoretic concepts at all. In fact, we can suppose that the con-
cepts of arithmetic are all the extra-logical concepts Jane has. I want
to suggest that, if the set-theoretic account of the reference of her
concepts is correct, Jane’s attempts to grasp their satisfaction con-
ditions will face similar difficulties to those that Peter encountered
with his concepts. Beliefs such as ‘ “1” refers to the successor of
0’ won’t do the trick. This belief would pair her concept ‘1’ with
the right set, but it wouldn’t enable her to grasp the reference of ‘1’
unless she grasped already which set is referred to by the complex
concept ‘the successor of 0’. As in Peter’s case, beliefs of this kind
would only enable her to grasp the satisfaction conditions of her
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concepts if she already grasped the satisfaction conditions of some
of them.
Trying to form arithmetical beliefs that are only made true by
the right interpretation won’t get her very far either, even if we
waive the difficulties involved in having a body of beliefs that is not
recursively axiomatisable and suppose that her beliefs constitute a
complete arithmetical theory. For there are several different ways of
interpreting arithmetical concepts in set-theoretic terms all of which
would make her theory come out true. A complete arithmetical theory
would only enable her to grasp the fact that the satisfaction conditions
of her concepts are determined by one of the correspondences within
this range. If her concepts refer to sets, Jane, with her arithmetical
concepts and beliefs, cannot grasp their satisfaction conditions.
I want to suggest that a different account of the reference of her
concepts would make the difficulty disappear. Notice that the reason
why she faces a problem is that the identity of the objects in the range
of the satisfaction relation is not completely determined by which
of her concepts apply to them. Her beliefs specify that her singular
concepts refer to the elements of a progression, but they leave it open
which specific progression is the relevant one. Obviously, this situ-
ation generates a problem only if we can meaningfully ask whether
Jane’s concepts refer to this or that progression. The problem would
disappear if we maintained, instead, that Jane’s concepts refer, not
to these or those objects exemplifying the abstract structure of a
progression, but rather to locations in the abstract structure itself.55
On this account, in order to identify the referent of ‘3’, Jane doesn’t
need to find out whether it is this or that set. She only has to decide
where in the abstract structure it stands with respect to the referents
of the rest of her concepts. She has to determine, e.g., that it bears
the relation denoted by ‘>’ to the referents of ‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘2’, that it
is the image under the function denoted by ‘+’ of the referents of ‘1’
and ‘2’, etc. But this is precisely what is achieved by her beliefs ‘0
< 3’, ‘1 < 3’, ‘2 < 3’, ‘1 + 2 = 3’, etc. On this account, acquiring true
arithmetical beliefs is all one needs to do to identify the referents of
arithmetical concepts. If Jane could have all true arithmetical beliefs,
there would be nothing she didn’t know about the referents of her
concepts.
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A similar approach to the reference of Peter’s concepts may enable
him to avoid his difficulties. According to this approach, the identity
of the referents of Peter’s concepts is exhaustively determined by
which beliefs involving these concepts are true. On this account, the
range of the satisfaction relation consists of locations in the abstract
structure defined by the true theory of the world involving these
concepts. Hence, in order to grasp which objects satisfy one of his
concepts, Peter only needs to grasp where in the abstract structure
these objects stand with respect to those that satisfy the rest of his
concepts. But this is precisely what he would achieve by acquiring
true beliefs.56
This approach to reference faces very serious problems. To men-
tion just one, it would make it hard to explain how a subject can
change his body of first order beliefs and take his new beliefs to
concern the same subject matter as the old ones, or how two subjects
could take their concepts to have the same satisfaction conditions
even though they disagree about the truth values of beliefs involving
them. I am not endorsing this approach. My goal in sketching it has
been to argue that the difficulty that I have raised in this paper is not
intrinsic to the notion of reference. Giving up metaphysical realism
might enable us to avoid the difficulty. Perhaps, if the view I have
sketched is the only alternative, learning to live with transcendence
may be seen as the lesser evil. But we shouldn’t presuppose that our
options are so severely limited. As Putnam himself puts it, echoing
Strawson,
we are constantly being asked to choose between metaphysical positions on the
one hand and reductionist positions on the other, and what is terribly difficult
(but what makes the game of philosophy worth the candle) is to show that the
metaphysical mystery is not the only alternative to the simplistic position of the
reductionist.57
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